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The small states do not represent a coherent group in the EU. A comparison between Ireland and
Denmark provides but one example. The two countries share similar views on a range of issues like
the role of the UN and human rights. Both countries have a special position on EU defence
cooperation. However, the two countries have a fundamentally different approach to the use of
force. The reason behind the formulation of the Danish opt-out on defence in 1993 was the fear that
EU-cooperation in the field would develop into a ‘European Army’ which could undermine NATO.
The reason was not a strong pacifist streak in Denmark.
In the following, Danish views on proposals in the Convention on CFSP and ESDP will be
presented. In a way such a presentation is outdated as the proposals have already been modified by
the Italian Presidency, and are likely to be further modified by current talks between Germany, the
United Kingdom and France on ESDP. This underlines the fact that EU foreign policy is more
about global developments than treaty language.
Comments on the proposals by the Convention will be supplementary to the comments made by
Daniel Keohane, which are comments I fully support.1
CFSP
Denmark2 supports the extension of QMV, but the foreign policy should remain intergovernmental.
The EU cannot impose a certain foreign policy on a Member State, but no Member State should
prevent the others from pursuing a common foreign policy. It is not surprising that Denmark
supports a strengthened CFSP. In a small state such as Denmark, which has been a member of the
EU since 1973, it has almost become a reflex when confronted with new foreign policy issues
always to consider the view of salient EU partners (larger Member States and/or like minded
Member States), and assess whether a common policy line is feasible. On a host of everyday foreign
policy issues, the smaller states are arguably dependent on the European partners who actually have
a policy or opinion on the matter.
Denmark also supports the merging of the two posts of the High Representative (Solana) and the
Commissioner on External Relations (Patten) in order to make the CFSP more coherent and
effective. Being a small state Denmark cannot afford the ‘luxury’ of having contradicting foreign
policies in different fields, and the same goes for the EU as the CFSP is not backed up by strong
capabilities. An improvement could be the establishment of a Diplomatic Service which would
allow the EU to spend less time on forming common analysis and more time on agreeing on a
common response to the problem at hand.
                                                
1 Daniel Keohane’s paper to the workshop, Possible Implications of the Constitutional Treaty for the EU Foreign and
Security Policy – An Irish Perspective.
2 For the Danish position on the Convention’s proposals, see “The Intergovernmental Conference 2003 – The Danish
Government’s Position Paper”, September 2003, [http://www.um.dk/cgi-
bin/dyn3nt/dyn3.exe?prog=show&pageid=308&postid=57].
Based on its recent experience of holding the EU Presidency, Denmark has been supportive of a
permanent Chair of the European Council as well as the Foreign Affairs Council, while she has her
reservations on team presidencies. In both cases continuity should allow for more efficient Council
deliberations internally and high-level representation externally.
ESDP
Denmark has an opt-out on defence cooperation according to which Denmark does not take part in
decisions and actions which have defence implications. The Government has stated clearly that the
opt-out is not in Denmark’s interest. As the Government has ruled out a Big Bang referendum – on
the new Constitutional Treaty as well as all three opt-outs – the opt-out on defence will be put to a
referendum separately. No date has been set for this referendum.
Due to the opt-out, Denmark has only expressed some general views on the ESDP at the IGC. In
general, Denmark supports a strengthening of EU’s military capabilities. For practical reasons this
should be done without duplicating existing structures, i.e. NATO. Denmark is open towards
structured cooperation, as long as it is based on transparency and openness.
In the following I will present some comments on the three main issues on ESDP: structured
cooperation, EU military headquarters and mutual defence. I will also touch on the issue of the
proposed solidarity clause, which is linked to internal security rather than external security.
Structured cooperation
As stated in Daniel Keohane’s paper it is unclear – even after the Presidency’s amendment
proposals – what the rules should be for structured cooperation. The lack of clarity allows for
different readings on the very purpose of structured cooperation. The purpose of introducing
flexibility could either be to allow for ad hoc coalitions inside the EU or to speed up the
development of capabilities. If the main purpose is ad hoc coalitions inside an EU framework, the
link between the group of Member States participating in structured cooperation and the EU25 is
likely to be weak. The German-French proposal in the Convention and the proposal by Germany,
France, Belgium and Luxembourg on April 29th, 2003 mentions a defence union inside the EU
consisting of Member States who wish to move at a higher speed of integration without having to
wait for the consent of EU25. The British proposal in the Convention also calls for flexibility, but
the underlying objective is for the avant-garde to move ahead with developing capabilities in order
to act as a stimulus to EU25. A strong link between the avant-garde group and EU25 is a
precondition if structured cooperation is to inspire the other Member States to do more in order to
catch up. A weak link is likely to divide the EU into an A- and B-team.
The challenge is to square the circle. On one hand structured cooperation should not be made
meaningless by setting the requirements so low that there is no added value. On the other hand
cooperation should not be turned into a closed club with little connection to the EU as a whole.
EU Military Headquarters
Another issue which is not directly linked to the IGC, but has been dealt with simultaneously, is
whether the EU should be capable of performing its own operational planning. Sceptic voices were
raised that the main purpose of structured cooperation was to allow a core group of countries to
move ahead with plans like the military headquarters in Tervuren proposed by Germany, France,
Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003.
There now seems to be a compromise between Germany, UK and France to set up a planning cell in
charge of autonomous EU-operations. There may also now be a good argument for setting up such a
planning capability. The problem has always been to explain that the EU needed its own planning
capability, when Berlin plus provided the EU with permanent access to NATO’s planning
capabilities in SHAPE. Therefore, the proposal for EU planning always appeared to be
‘unnecessary duplication’.
But if a division of labour between the EU and NATO should develop, it might turn out that
NATO’s SHAPE would not be well suited for planning the kind of operations that the EU wanted to
lead. In that case there could be a need for ‘constructive duplication’, where the EU could do its
own planning for autonomous operations. Some kind of geographic division of labour might be
developing. Ever since St. Malo in 1998 the United Kingdom and France have emphasized the need
for the EU to play an active role in African conflict prevention and crisis management. This was
underlined in the declaration from the Franco-British summit on November 24th, where the two
countries proposed the EU to create a rapid reaction force. According to the proposal the EU should
be able to respond to requests from the United Nations in situations similar to Bunia, where the EU
supplied an interim emergency force. The proposed ’headline goal’ is that the EU should be able
and willing to deploy an autonomous operation within 15 days with coherent battle-group sized
forces, each comprising around 1500 troops, with appropriate transport and sustainability. These
forces should have the capacity to operate under a Chapter VII mandate. If a divison of labour is to
develop between EU and NATO – in this case a geographic division of labour – there are arguments
in favour of developing EU military planning for autonomous operations.
Smaller states may also favour an EU planning cell to the present system, where only the big
countries have suitable national headquarters which are able to plan autonomous EU operations.
Many smaller states may prefer to participate in an EU Planning Cell rather than being seconded on
an ad hoc basis to national headquarters in one of the big countries.
Eventually, the Tervuren-proposal was put forward at a time when disagreement over Iraq was at its
highest and the whole subject has therefore become highly politicized.
Mutual Defence
On mutual defence Denmark shares the view of other Atlanticist countries that NATO provides an
adequate defence guarantee. It is quite odd why the EU should need a mutual defence clause at a
time where the threat of invasion is close to non-existing. The proposal by the Italian Presidency
that NATO is de facto to implement the defence guarantee could have the advantage of sending a
clear message that the EU is not to build its own integrated military structure. However, the
problem of the position of the non-aligned countries and Cyprus remains.
Solidarity clause
The aim of the Convention was mainly to strengthen the EU’s role in projecting stability.
Eventually, the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 placed the issue of protecting the EU civil
population from terrorism at the forefront. The proposal on a solidarity clause is central in this
respect. It has been stated that it is only a codification of already existing arrangements – that
everybody would assist a neighbour or EU partner struck by terrorism. But the solidarity clause is
innovative on two accounts: 1) it entails an obligation to assist and 2) it combines the use of civil
and military resources.
It will require substantial planning if the EU is to fulfill its commitment. In practice that requires a
decision within 12 hours on assistance which is likely to cover experts and equipment from a broad
range of sectors such as the military, police, first responders, health system and intelligence. To
coordinate assistance across sectors and across borders requirea a high amount of planning and
training. The Convention proposed setting up pools of specialized civilian and military units doing
joint training and planning. One could also imagine civil-military units, for instance on bio terror
with military experts, medical doctors, laboratory technicians as well as equipment (transport,
laboratory, decontamination and field hospitals etc.)
The solidarity clause has won broad support, although Denmark may have a problem because of its
defence opt-out. The Convention was very careful to avoid confusion with a mutual defence clause.
But in a way this underlines the question: why should the EU do nothing to deter terrorist attacks
and military attacks?
Conclusion
The Convention set out to define the EU’s role in view of new security threats. Solana’s security
strategy defines the main threats to Europe’s security as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and failed states. Is the EU going to use its military tool in order to deal with those
threats? The overall answer is that the military tool is not going to have a prominent role –
especially not in dealing with terrorism and WMD. The EU is to continue emphasizing having a full
tool box consisting of diplomacy, economic inducements and sanctions, intelligence and police
cooperation and the military tool. In dealing with terrorism and WMD the use of force will remain a
last resort. Failed states which represent a dangerous nexus together with terrorism and WMD
might be an area where the EU is willing and able to use its military tool in order to stabilize a
failing state or post-conflict state. Solana’s security strategy calls for the EU as a whole to “develop
a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.” This is a
‘security culture’ which for the time being is more likely to find expression through the stabilization
of the new neighbourhood rather than military attacks on terrorist networks or nuclear sites in rogue
states.
France always talked about the need for Europe to develop its own defence identity. Maybe this is
now finally happening, but it is not the identity of a military alliance, but rather an identity being
formed by the very nature of EU cooperation. The EU, more than any other organisation or federal
state, symbolizes the erosion of borders and erosion of distinctions between internal and external
security as well as the distinction between military and civil means. The EU is likely to strengthen
further its ‘tool box approach’ to security where the military tool is only one but many tools.
